Labour powerless to deliver

'There has been serious damage to the trust that voters have in New Labour's promises with regard to Scotland. Voters are of the opinion that New Labour is currently trying to pull back from its previous commitment to Scottish devolution.' Confidential System Three report for the Scottish Labour Party.

Powerless to deliver once they're in power

by Dr. Madsen Pirie, president of the Adam Smith Institute
in Scotland on Sunday 1 December 1996

The simplest reason for supposing that Labour will renege on its pledge for a Scottish parliament is that it has reneged on practically everything else. It has, in quick succession, abandoned a commitment to repeal the Conservative trade union legislation, ended its plan to repeal the NHS reforms, dropped its opposition to the opt-out schools, given up the idea of re-nationalising the privatised industries and utilities, and quietly fudged the wording of what were previously strong commitments to increased spending. These are but a few of the U-turns. The cynic might ask what is so special about the devolution pledge. If Labour is prepared to abandon anything else which causes it difficulty, why not that one as well?

Labour's problems over the referendum demonstrate the pitfalls. It conceded a referendum from a previously watertight position that none was necessary. Commitment to a second, confirmatory referendum on taxation only lasted a week before Islington over-ruled it, but it showed how uncomfortable Labour is with the practical details of its policy.

Each success by Michael Forsyth and his team in picking holes and absurdities in Labour's plan makes it more and more likely that what remain as firm pledges will be redefined to create more opportunities for wriggling into escape routes.

There is, however, a more substantial reason for supposing that Labour will renege. A Labour government would need to put its Referendum Bill through parliament before the vote itself could be held. In a crowded initial timetable this could well take most of the first session. Thus, long before Labour could conduct the referendum and introduce the Act to create a Scottish parliament, there will have been months of wrangling and late-night debates. The constitutional weaknesses and contradictions of the devolution plan will have been aired long before it even comes to drafting the bill itself.

What size of majority do people expect a possible Labour government to enjoy? Few commentators expect more than a handful of seats overall, and many predict a government which needs the support of at least some of the minor parties. It is precisely this sort of nightmare with which the Conservatives have had to struggle. It is a situation which gives power to every fractious MP with a hobby-horse to ride or a grudge to nurse. John Major is quite good at dealing with difficult people, but TonyBlair has thus far been more used to imposing his authority than bargaining for it.

Europe would be the rock upon which Labour unity would founder, just as it proved to be for the Conservatives. A significant number of Labour backbenchers are adamantly opposed to monetary union and the creeping federalism which New Labour seems to endorse. A small majority in parliament would give them immense power to amend, to deter, to delay and to wreck. Tempers would flare, rebellions would break out, and any divisive legislation would tend to head for the back-burner, as it did for Labour's opponents.

Labour has one present advantage which would vanish with office. At the moment, every LabourMP can hope for one of the 120-odd government jobs, even if only a minor, unpaid one. No one knows if they personally will be in the government; and this gives all of them a reason for loyalty and unity. The Conservatives are not as fortunate. Their non-ministers and ex-ministers know they are out, and have little to lose by rebellion. After a Labour victory, the ones who had not been included would be much freer to cause trouble.

It is also worth noting that the Liberal Democrats, who might be essential allies, are sceptical of the tax question on any referendum. If the Scots opt for a parliament, but decline to let it add to their tax bill, the Liberal Democrats have said they will oppose the Devolution Bill itself.

After an exhausting and fractious session dealing extensively with European matters, a small- majority Labour government could easily turn to the Scots and plead that it was simply unable to deliver on devolution, "We tried in good faith," it might say, "but we simply did not have the votes in parliament." It might promise that, given a bigger majority next time, it would reinstate the pledge. And some people might even believe Labour.

There is a third line of reasoning which supports the idea of a Labour U-turn on devolution. It is that Labour has not solved, or come close to solving, the constitutional problems which its proposals would engender.

As last month's near rebellion on the Euro-vote showed, MPs of all parties jealously guard the House's right to scrutinise, to approve, and to maintain the correct constitutional safeguards. There is no question at all that the Commons will consent to the creation of a Scotland which has its own parliament for such matters as health and education, yet which still sends 72 MPs down to tell the English what to do.

Scotland is already over-represented in population terms. Precedent suggests that as powers are repatriated to Scotland, its Westminster representation must decline. The House will certainly insist on a reduction in the number of Scottish MPs, perhaps down to 40. There will be English Labour MPs as well as Scottish ones, who would flinch at the thought of how hard that might make it to gain a future Labour majority at Westminster.

It is highly unlikely that the House would consent to continue the tax support (subvention) which the Scots presently enjoy, if they had the power to tax themselves but did not use that power. Labour MPs might not care to face a Scottish electorate which lost, through their own actions, the additional spending it currently enjoys on roads, health, education and other services.

Finally, and not least, the House would for months pick over the bones and carcass of the West Lothian question, examining each morsel of it. Could Scots really elect Westminster MPs to decide health and education for England, but not for themselves? Would England tolerate it for a moment? Could a Scottish MP hold office with purely English responsibilities? Could there be such a constitutional novelty as a government which had a majority on defence, crime and foreign policy, but not on education, health and social services?

Consider how Labour's resolve might wilt following night after night, month after month, of this relentless probing. After all, it has wilted many times already under less pressure than this.

The odds are very high that in the turmoil of such a parliament, the Devolution Bill would die, even if it had not already quietly expired at the prospect, or, earlier than that, been watered down into a meaningless and powerless expression of reassurance; a gesture, in fact.

Gestures and symbols are important; people have fought wars over them. Michael Forsyth has returned the Stone of Destiny to show that Scotland can enjoy nationhood without being a separate political state. It is ironic to note that he is rapidly giving the Scots more local say in their own affairs than even Labour could deliver. Labour will renege, either before the next election, or in the first year of any Labour government. There will be too little gain for the agonies and humiliations it will be put through. Devolution will self-destruct.

Then perhaps the Scots will debate whether they believe, with Alex Salmond, that only an independent state can give them a voice which speaks proudly for Scotland, or believe, with Michael Forsyth, that both Scotland and the rest of the UK would be impoverished and diminished in influence if the Union were to be torn apart.